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Abstract—Network coding is an efficient means to improve
the spectrum efficiency of satellite communications. However, its
resilience to eavesdropping attacks is not well understood. This
paper studies the confidentiality issue in a bidirectional satellite
network consisting of two mobile users who want to exchange
message via a multibeam satellite using the XOR network coding
protocol. We aim to maximize the sum secrecy rate by designing
the optimal beamforming vector along with optimizing the return
and forward link time allocation. The problem is non-convex,
and we find its optimal solution using semidefinite programming
together with a 1-D search. For comparison, we also solve
the sum secrecy rate maximization problem for a conventional
reference scheme without using network coding. Simulation
results using realistic system parameters demonstrate that the
bidirectional scheme using network coding provides considerably
higher secrecy rate compared to that of the conventional scheme.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, network coding, bidi-
rectional satellite communications, secrecy rate, semidefinite
programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Satellite communications (SATCOM) is getting more and
more integrated into communication networks to compliment
the current terrestrial communication systems. Satellite ser-
vices have to support increasing demands for data transfer.
To realize bidirectional satellite communications, traditionally
orthogonal resources either in frequency or time domain
should be used to avoid interference between users. To save
the precious wireless resources, network coding has been used
in this work as an efficient protocol to exchange information
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between two mobile satellite users. The basic principle is
that the received information from users are combined on
the satellite or gateway (GW), and then the mixed signal
is broadcast to users at the same time and using the same
frequency. Because each user can subtract its own message, it
can easily decode the message from the other user.
However, due to the broadcast nature and immense area
coverage, satellite communications systems, e.g., in military
and commercial applications, are vulnerable to security attacks
such as eavesdropping. Currently, security in SATCOM is
achieved at upper layers by means of encryption such as
the Advanced Encryption Standard [1], [2]. Nevertheless,
traditional security is based on the assumption of limited
computational capability of the malicious nodes, and thus there
exists the risk that a malicious node can successfully break
an encryption, and get access to sensitive satellite data [3].
In contrast to the upper layer encryption techniques, recently
there has been significant interest in securing wireless commu-
nications at the physical layer using an information-theoretic
approach named “secrecy rate” [4]. The main advantage of this
approach is that the malicious nodes cannot even get access
to protected information regardless of their computational
capabilities.
While network coding can greatly improve the system
throughput, whether it is more secure than the conventional
scheme, which does not use network coding, is largely un-
known in SATCOM. In this work, we will leverage the
physical layer security approach to address the confidentiality
issue in bidirectional SATCOM using the principle of network
coding. Below, we provide an overview on the applications
of network coding to SATCOM and the related work in the
physical layer security literature.
A. Literature Review
1) Network coding related works: Network coding tech-
nique, first introduced in [5], can considerably reduce delay,
processing complexity and power consumption, and can sig-
nificantly increase the data rate and robustness [6]. In the
popular XOR network coding scheme, the received signals
at an intermediate node are first decoded into bit streams, and
then XOR is applied on the bit streams to combine them. The
processed bits are re-encoded and then broadcast. Utilization
of network coding has been studied in both terrestrial and
satellite networks. The authors in [7] apply superposition cod-
ing and XOR network coding to a bidirectional terrestrial relay
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2network. A multi-group multi-way terrestrial relay network
is considered in [8] where superposition coding and XOR
network coding are investigated and compared to each other.
Network coding can also considerably improve the spectral
efficiency in bidirectional SATCOM in which two mobile
users exchange information via the satellite. The work in [9]
compares the amplify-and-forward (AF) method with the XOR
network coding scheme in a satellite scenario. A joint delay
and packet drop rate control protocol without the knowledge
of lost packets for mobile satellite using network coding is
studied in [10]. In [11], buffers are designed for satellites
when the network coding scheme is employed. Random lin-
ear network coding is used in [12] to minimize the packet
delivery time. Satellite beam switching for mobile users is
tackled in [13] where the network coding scheme increases the
robustness in delivery of the packets when mobile terminals
move from beam to beam. The XOR network coding protocol
is demonstrated in a satellite test bed in [14].
2) Physical layer security related works: Wyner in [4] first
showed that secure transmission is possible for the legitimate
user given the eavesdropper receives noisier data compared
to the legitimate receiver. Inspired by Wyner’s work, [15]
extended the idea of physical layer secrecy rate from the
discrete memoryless wiretap channel to Gaussian wiretap
channel. The Wyner’s wiretap channel was generalized in [16]
to the broadcast channel. After the seminal works done in [4],
[15], [16], there have been substantial amount of works in
physical layer secrecy. Here, we only review those most
relevant to network coding and bidirectional communications.
The authors in [17] consider a relay utilizing the XOR network
coding protocol where joint relay and jammer selection is done
to enhance the secrecy rate. A bidirectional AF relay network
with multiple-antenna nodes is considered in [18] where the
relay beamforming vector is designed by the waterfilling
method to improve the secrecy rate. The authors in [19]
consider random relay selection in a bidirectional network in
which the relay performs both data transmission and jamming
the eavesdropper at the same time to increase the secrecy. The
work in [20] performs selection over AF relays and jammers
in a bidirectional network for the single-antenna case, and pre-
coding in the multiple-antenna case to enhance the secrecy. To
maximize the secrecy in a bidirectional network, the authors
in [21] consider the location and distribution of nodes while
joint relay and jammer selection is performed. Distributed
beamforming along with artificial noise and beamforming is
studied in [22] for a bidirectional AF relay network. The work
in [23] designs the distributed beamforming weights for a
bidirectional network where one intermediate node acts as
a jammer. In contrast to the terrestrial literature, there are
very few works in physical layer security for SATCOM. The
problem of minimizing the transmit power on a multibeam
satellite while satisfying a minimum per user secrecy rate
is studied in [24]. Iterative algorithms are used to jointly
optimize the transmission power and the beamforming vector
by perfectly nulling the received signal at the eavesdropper.
Both optimal and suboptimal solutions are developed in [25]
where the use of artificial noise is also studied.
Despite the physical layer security and network coding
works in the terrestrial and SATCOM scenarios, some un-
addressed issue are left. In [7], only downlink bottlenecks
are considered when designing the beamforming weights for
the XOR network coding case. The uplink bottlenecks also
need to be considered when optimizing the uplink-downlink
time allocation. In [8], the authors consider the decoding-re-
encoding and designing the beamforming vector separately.
The works in [19], [21] consider single-antenna relay where
the AF protocol is used in a bidirectional network. The authors
in [18], [22], [23] use the analog network coding protocol
in a two-way relay network to facilitate secure information
exchange between two users. Furthermore, the mentioned
terrestrial works in physical layer security for bidirectional
communications assume one eavesdropper in the environment.
The works in [24], [25] design the beamforming weights for
unidirectional service for fixed users in the forward link (FL).
B. Our Contribution
In this work, we study the network coding based bidirec-
tional SATCOM in which two mobile users exchange data
via a transparent multibeam satellite in the presence of two
eavesdroppers. There is an eavesdropper present for each user
who overhears the bidirectional communications. The users
employ omnidirectional antennas and the communication is
prone to eavesdropping in both the return link (RL) and FL. In
the RL, two users send signals using two orthogonal frequency
channels; the signals collected by the satellite are passed to the
GW, where they are decoded, XOR-ed and then the produced
stream is re-encoded. This combined stream is multiplied by
the beamforming vector which contains the designed weight
of each feed. Consequently, each element of the resultant
vector is transmitted to the satellite using the feeder link.
Each element which includes both the feed weight and the
data signal is applied to the corresponding feed to adjust the
beams for broadcasting to both users simultaneously in the
FL. This scheme is more power-efficient than the conventional
method where network coding in not utilized and the power is
splitted into two data streams. This benefit is extremely vital
for SATCOM because of the limited on-board power.
Our main contributions in this work are summarized below
to differentiate it from the prior work:
1) We incorporate XOR network coding into SATCOM in
order to enable both efficient and secure bidirectional
data exchange.
2) The end-to-end sum secrecy rate is first derived, and
then maximized by designing the optimal beamforming
vector and the RL and FL time allocation. The optimiza-
tion problem regarding the beamforming vector is solved
using semi-definite programming (SDP) along with 1-D
search.
3) We provide comprehensive simulation results to demon-
strate the advantage of the bidirectional scheme over the
conventional scheme using realistic SATCOM parame-
ters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the SATCOM network topology as
well as deriving the signal model and defining the secrecy
3rates. The problems for maximizing the sum secrecy rate are
defined and solved in Section III. In Section IV, numerical
results are presented. The conclusion is drawn in Section V.
Notation: Upper-case and lower-case bold-faced letters are
used to denote matrices and column vectors, respectively.
Superscripts (·)T and (·)H represent transpose and Hermitian
operators, respectively. IN×N denotes an N by N identity
matrix. CN (m,K) denotes the complex Gaussian distribution
with mean vector m and covariance matrix K. λmax(A,B) is
the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix pencil (A,B). A  0
means that the Hermitian matrix A is positive semidefinite.
‖ · ‖ is the Frobenius norm and | · | represents the absolute
value of a scalar.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a satellite communication system comprised of
two users denoted by U1 and U2 who exchange information
with each other, one multibeam transparent satellite denoted
by S, one GW, two eavesdroppers denoted by E1 and E2 as
depicted in Fig. 1. Users are located in different beams of
the satellite, and they transmit the RL signals using differ-
ent frequency channels simultaneously. We assume that each
user and each eavesdropper is equipped with a single omni-
directional antenna. Because of the long distance between
the users, there is no direct link between them; furthermore,
eavesdroppers cannot cooperate and Ei can only overhear Ui
for i = 1, 2. Contemporary orbiting satellites such as ICO,
SkyTerra, and Thuraya have limited power, here defined as
PS , and some of them do not have the on-board processing
ability to decode the received messages or perform on-board
beamforming, so they have to forward the received signal to
the GW to get it processed [26]–[28]. Using the GW to process
the signal and designing the feed weights is referred to as
the ground-based beamforming technique. The ground-based
beamforming technique is perceived as the most convenient
and economical approach [28]. In this paper, we consider
a commercial satellite without digital processing ability and
follow the ground-based beamforming paradigm.
In our satellite network model, we assume that the eaves-
dropper is a regular user which is part of the network.
However, it is considered as an unintended user, potential
eavesdropper, which the information needs to be kept secret
from it. Due to the fact that the eavesdropper is part of the
network, it is possible to estimate the channels to it. Hence,
similar to the works [29]–[33], we assume that the eaves-
dropper’s channel state information (CSI) is known. Based
on the mentioned assumption, we assume that the users and
eavesdropper know all the CSIs. Further, all communication
channels are known and fixed during the period of communi-
cation. It is worth mentioning that in the secrecy rate analysis
of XOR network coding, only the CSI of the eavesdroppers
in the RL is required. Although we assume the availability of
the eavesdropper’s CSI, there are methods such as null-space
artificial noise transmission [34], random beamforming [35]–
[37], or effective channel coding design to strengthen the
cryptography [38] in order to sustain secrecy without having
the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI. Another alternative
Gateway
(GW)
Satellite 
(SAT)
Phase I: U1-E1; U2-E2 
Phase I: U1-SAT; U2-SAT
E1
Phase II: SAT-GW
Phase III: GW-SAT
Phase IV: SAT-U1; SAT-U2
Phase IV: SAT-E1; SAT-E2
E2
Fig. 1. Bidirectional satellite communication network.
can be using the statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
CSI in order to improve the secrecy [39]–[42]. Also, the
interference alignment technique can be used along with
statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI to enhance
the secrecy [43]. In the situations when the geographical area
of the eavesdropper is known, the worst-case scenario can be
considered. In this scenario, the best CSI from the user to the
eavesdropper’s area is considered for the design. One possible
example for the worst-case scenario can be when the occupied
zone by the enemy is known. This example can be one of the
applications of this paper.
To acquire the RL channel state information (CSI) at the
GW, the users send the pilot signals along with the data
toward the satellite. For the FL CSI, the GW sends pilots to
the users. Afterwards, the estimated CSI by the users is sent
back to the GW. Therefore, getting the FL CSI takes more
time compared to the RL CSI [44]. The GWs are equipped
with advanced transceivers and antennas and because of this
reason, the communication link between the GW and the
satellite (feeder link) is modeled as an ideal link. Hence,
similar to the works [27], [45]–[48] which are carried out
in the satellite communications literature, we assume that the
channel between the satellite and the GW, which is referred
to as the feeder link, is ideal with abundant bandwidth.
The complete communication phases of the network coding
based scheme are summarized in Table I. The conventional
scheme without using network coding is also included for
comparison and details are given in Section II-B. The first two
phases for the RL are the same for both schemes while the
main difference lies in the FL transmission. In the conventional
scheme, signals are sent in different time slots for each user
in the FL, so this scheme has less available transmission time
for each user. In the bidirectional scheme, signal streams are
combined, and then sent in the FL using the XOR network
coding protocol, therefore, the spectral efficiency is signifi-
cantly improved compared to the conventional scheme.
A. Network coding based bidirectional SATCOM
1) Signal model: In this case, the whole communication
takes place in four phases. In Phase I, both users transmit
4TABLE I
COMMUNICATION STAGES FOR THE XOR NETWORK CODING AND THE
CONVENTIONAL SCHEMES.
Conventional reference scheme XOR network coding scheme
Phase I: U1 and U2 simultaneously send their signals, s1 and
s2, to the satellite while they are overheard by E1 and E2,
respectively.
Phase II: The satellite passes the received signal to the gateway
for processing. At the gateway, the users signals are separately
decoded.
Phase III: The intended sig-
nal for U1, decoded s2, is re-
encoded at the gateway and
the corresponding feed weights
are designed. Then, the feed
weights multiplied by the data
signal are sent to the satellite.
Phase III: The gateway ap-
plies XOR operation on the
decoded streams from s1 and
s2 to create a merged stream
of bits and the feed weights
are designed. Then, the feed
weights multiplied by the data
signal are sent to the satellite.Phase IV: The satellite passes
the re-encoded signal through
the corresponding beam to U1
while E1 is listening to it.
Phase V: The intended sig-
nal for U2, decoded s1, is re-
encoded at the gateway and
the corresponding feed weights
are designed. Then, the feed
weights multiplied by the data
signal are sent back to the
satellite.
Phase IV: The satellite broad-
casts the merged stream to-
ward the users through the
corresponding beams which is
wiretapped by both E1 and
E2.
Phase VI: The satellite passes
the re-encoded signal through
the corresponding beam to U2
while E2 is listening to it.
signals using different frequencies simultaneously. The signals
received at the satellite and the eavesdroppers are
yS1 =
√
PU1hU1,S s1 + nS1 , (1)
yS2 =
√
PU2hU2,S s2 + nS2 , (2)
yRLE1 =
√
PU1hU1,E1s1 + nE1 , (3)
yRLE2 =
√
PU2hU2,E2s2 + nE2 , (4)
where PUi is the transmitted power by the users for i = 1, 2,
h and h represent the user-eavesdropper and user-satellite
channels, respectively, and the corresponding source and des-
tination are denoted by the subscript. The channel for the
satellite is a NS × 1 vector where NS is the number of
the satellite feeds. Additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN)
are denoted by n and n with n ∼ CN (0, σ2) and n ∼
CN (0, σ2INS×NS), respectively. We consider the noise power
for users, satellite and eavesdroppers as KTB, where K is the
Boltzman’s constant which is −226.8 dBW/K/Hz, T is the on-
board temperature and B is the carrier bandwidth. We assume
that s1 and s2 are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Gaussian random source signals with zero mean and
unit variance. For convenience, we use the noise variance,
σ2, instead of KTB and omit the bandwidth, B, in the
rate expressions throughout the paper. Note that we consider
different temperatures for ground nodes and the satellite. The
satellite forwards the received signal to the GW using the
feeder link in Phase II and thanks to the ideal link between
the satellite and the GW, the same signals as (1) and (2) are
present at the GW to be processed.
At the GW, the received signal is filtered and users’ data are
separated and decoded into two bit streams denoted by x1 and
x2, respectively. The GW applies the bit-wise XOR algebraic
operation to the decoded bit streams of the users to get the
combined stream
xGW = x1 ⊕ x2. (5)
Note that before applying the XOR network coding, the GW
uses zero-padding to add zeros to the shorter bit stream in
order to make equal length bit streams out of the two different
bit streams sent by the users [49], [50]. In Phase III, xGW is
encoded into sGW with unit power, and then multiplied by
the beamforming vector, w. Using the ideal feeder link, each
element, wisGW (t), of the produced vector, wsGW , at the GW
which both includes the feed weight, wi, and the data signal,
sGW , is transmitted from the GW to the satellite. Since the
codebook used at the GW to encode xGW can be different in
the XOR network coding scheme, the RL and FL transmission
times are generally different for the XOR network coding. This
enables optimum RL and FL time allocation for the XOR
network coding. The received signal by satellite is denoted
as sS = HGW,SwsGW . The model sS = HGW,SwsGW
encapsulates the process of transmitting each element of the
vector wsGW from the GW to the satellite. Since the feeder
link is considered to be ideal, HGW,S is a NS ×NS identity
matrix. Finally, in Phase IV, each feed weight designed at
the gateway, which includes the data signal, is applied to
the corresponding feed at the satellite. Hence, the beams are
adjusted and the signal sS is broadcast through the antennas.
The received signals at two users are, respectively,
yFLXORU1 = h
T
S,U1sS + nU1 , (6)
yFLXORU2 = h
T
S,U2sS + nU2 . (7)
Similarly, the received signals at the eavesdroppers in Phase
IV are, respectively,
yFLXORE1 = h
T
S,E1sS + nE1 , (8)
yFLXORE2 = h
T
S,E2sS + nE2 . (9)
In the following, we shall define the sum secrecy rate. We
first introduce the users’ rates and eavesdroppers’ channel
capacities.
2) Users’ RL rates: Consider t1 and t2 for the RL (Phase I)
and FL (Phase IV) transmission time, respectively. In Phase I,
we can characterize the RL rates (RRLU1 , R
RL
U2
) by the following
equations [51, Chapter 5]:
RRLU1 ≤ IRLU1 = t1 log
(
1 +
PU1
∥∥hU1,S∥∥2
σ2S
)
(10)
RRLU2 ≤ IRLU2 = t1 log
(
1 +
PU2
∥∥hU2,S∥∥2
σ2S
)
, (11)
where I denotes channel capacity or the maximum supported
rate and R is the maximum achievable rate.
53) Users’ FL rates: After receiving the FL signal, users
decode sS . As each user knows its own transmitted bits,
it can use the XOR operation to retrieve the intended bits.
Subsequently, using (6) and (7), the FL rates can be expressed
as
RFLXOR = min
{
IFLXORU1 , I
FLXOR
U2
}
, (12)
IFLXORU1 = t2 log
(
1 +
|hTS,U1w|2
σ2U1
)
, (13)
IFLXORU2 = t2 log
(
1 +
|hTS,U2w|2
σ2U2
)
. (14)
Since the data for both users have gone through a bit-wise
XOR operation at the GW and a combined signal is broadcast,
the GW has to adjust the combined signal’s data rate to match
both users’ channel capacities. This rate should be equal to
the minimum FL channel rate between the satellite and the
users in Phase IV before sending sS to the satellite.
4) Eavesdroppers’ channel capacities: Using (3) and (8),
the channel capacity from U1 to E1, IRLE1 , and from satellite
to E1, IFLXORE1 , can be expressed, respectively, as
IRLE1 = t1 log
(
1 +
PU1 |hU1,E1 |2
σ2E1
)
, (15)
IFLXORE1 = t2 log
(
1 +
|hTS,E1w|2
σ2E1
)
. (16)
The channel capacities for E2 can be derived in a similar way.
5) Secrecy rate definition: First, we derive the the secrecy
rate for the RLs and FLs, and then the end-to-end secrecy
rate. In [52], the result of [4] is extended to fading channels
with multiple-antenna transmitter, receiver, and eavesdropper.
Using the special case of the result in [52] for single-
antenna transmitter, multiple-antenna receiver, and single-
antenna eavesdropper along with employing (10) and (15), the
secrecy rate for the RL of U1 is calculated as
SRRLU1 = I
RL
U1 − IRLE1 , (17)
where the notation “SR” means “secrecy rate”.
To calculate the secrecy rate in the FL, first, we derive the
information that E1 can recover during the RL transmission
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Independent of getting a positive or zero secrecy
rate defined for the RL of U1 in (17), E1 cannot recover any
bits from U2 transmitted message using the FL transmission.
Proof: To recover bits from U2, E1 has to apply XOR
operation between the bits recovered from U1 in the RL
transmission and the bits derived from the satellite broadcast
in the FL transmission. Hence, the information detected by E1
in the FL depends on the bits recovered from U1 in the RL
transmission. The recovered bits from U1 in the RL depend
on the sign of the secrecy rate defined in (17). The sign of the
RL secrecy rate in (17) has the following possibilities:
1) If IRLU1 − IRLE1 > 0, then U1 can establish a perfectly
secured connection so that the eavesdropper cannot get
any bits from U1 in the RL [52]. Hence, E1 does not
have the bits transmitted by U1 in the RL and it cannot
recover any bits from U2 using the FL transmission.
2) If IRLU1 − IRLE1 ≤ 0, then the secrecy rate is zero. There-
fore, U1 cannot establish a secure connection in the RL.
In this case, U1 remains silent during the corresponding
time slot. In this time slot, GW generates random bits
instead of the bits from U1 and applies XOR between
them and the bits from U2. As a result, E1 cannot
recover any bits from U2 using the FL transmission.
Note that since the RL time, t1, is always positive and all the
channels are known, the sign of the expression IRLU1 − IRLE1 is
known prior to the beamformer design.
A similar argument as in Lemma 1 can be applied to E2.
Consequently, using Lemma 1, the secrecy rate for the FL
is given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Assume that there exists at least one RL with a
positive secrecy rate. Then, the secrecy rate in the FL is given
as below:
SRFLXOR =

min
{
IFLXORU1 , I
FLXOR
U2
}
SRRLU1 > 0,
SRRLU2 > 0,
IFLXORU1 SR
RL
U1
= 0,
SRRLU2 > 0,
IFLXORU2 SR
RL
U1
> 0,
SRRLU2 = 0.
(18)
Proof: Excluding the case that both RLs have zero secrecy
rate, i.e., the total secrecy rate is zero, the secrecy rate for the
FL transmission for different signs of the secrecy rate in the
RL is given as follows:
1) If SRRLU1 > 0 and SR
RL
U2
> 0, then according to
Lemma 1, E1 and E2 cannot wiretap any bits from
U2 and U1, respectively, using the FL transmission.
Therefore, using (12), the secrecy rate in the FL is
min
{
IFLXORU1 , I
FLXOR
U2
}
.
2) If SRRLU1 > 0 and SR
RL
U2
= 0, then according to
Lemma 1, E1 cannot wiretap any bits from U2 using
the FL transmission. Further, since the RL of U2 is not
secure, U2 does not transmit and E2 does not get any bits
from U2. Hence, E2 cannot recover bits from U1 using
the FL transmission. Since U1 is not expected to receive
any message because of SRRLU2 = 0, the FL secrecy rate
is IFLXORU2 .
3) If SRRLU1 = 0 and SR
RL
U2
> 0, similar to the procedure
as in Case 2, the secrecy rate in the FL is IFLXORU1 .
According to the results in Cases 1, 2, and 3, the secrecy rate
of the FL is derived as in (18).
According to Lemma 2, when the XOR protocol is used, the
FLs are totally secured. Note that for the Cases 2 and 3, the
GW creates random bits instead of the message from the user
with insecure link, i.e., zero secrecy rate in the RL. Then, the
GW applies XOR between the received message from the user
which has a positive secrecy rate in the RL and the randomly
generated bits. This way, the eavesdropper still receives a
6combined message when the secrecy rate is zero in one of
the RLs.
To derive the end-to-end secrecy rate for U1, we invoke
Theorem 1 in [53], which states that, when decoding and re-
encoding is performed by an intermediate node, the secrecy
rate of each hop needs to be taken into account as a bottleneck
to derive the end-to-end secrecy rate. Since decoding and re-
encoding is performed at the GW, the result of Theorem 1
in [53] can be applied. Consequently, using the mentioned
theorem and the secrecy rate derived in (17) and the result
of Lemma 2 in (18), the end-to-end secrecy rate for U1 is
calculated by
SRXORU1 = min
{
SRRLU1 , SR
FLXOR
U1
}
. (19)
The end-to-end secrecy rate for U2 can be derived in a similar
way. The sum end-to-end secrecy rate is expressed as
SRXOR = SRXORU1 + SR
XOR
U2 . (20)
B. Conventional SATCOM
A conventional scheme without using network coding is
described here as a performance benchmark.
1) Signal model: As shown in Table I, the Phases I and
II are the same for the conventional and the XOR network
coding schemes, which result in the same signal model for
both schemes. In Phases III and V, the GW sends back each
element of the processed s2 and s1 to the satellite, respectively,
using the ideal feeder link where s1 and s2 are NS×1 vectors
containing both the feed weights and the users’ data signals.
s1 and s2 are defined as s1 = w1sˆ1 and s2 = w2sˆ2, where sˆ1
and sˆ2 are the decoded and re-encoded versions of the data
signals received from U1 and U2 at the GW with unit power,
and w1 and w2 are beamforming vectors to be designed at the
GW. Note that since different Gaussian codebooks are used at
the GW to re-encode the signals for U1 and U2, the generated
signals at the GW are different from those received from the
users. Therefore, generated signals at the GW are shown by
sˆ1 and sˆ2.
The satellite applies each component of the vector s2,
containing the feed weight multiplied by the data signal, to
the corresponding feed. Then, the beam is adjusted and sˆ2 is
sent toward U1 in Phase IV, and the received signals at U1
and E1 are, respectively,
yFLConU1 = h
T
S,U1s2 + nU1 , (21)
yFLConE1 = h
T
S,E1s2 + nE1 . (22)
Similarly, at the end of Phase VI, the received signals at U2
and E2 are, respectively,
yFLConU2 = h
T
S,U2s1 + nU2 , (23)
yFLConE2 = h
T
S,E2s1 + nE2 . (24)
The beamformer weights in the conventional scheme are
exclusively designed at the GW for each user. Hence, when
data is being transmitted for U1, the satellite’s main lobe is
focused toward U1. Since E2 is outside the beam directed
toward U1 and the beamfomers are designed to maximize the
signal strength toward U1, E2 receives the signal from side
lobes. As a result, the signal received by E2 is weak. Similar
conditions hold for E1 when transmitting to U2. To make the
derivation tractable, we neglect these weak signals received by
E2 and E1 in Phases IV and VI, respectively. As a result, the
sum secrecy rate derived for the conventional scheme shall be
an upper-bound.
2) Users’ rates: The RL rates for the conventional SAT-
COM are the same as the XOR network coding scheme in (10)
and (11). Using (21) and (23), the FL rates to U1 and U2 after
self-interference cancelation can be derived, respectively, as
IFLConU1 = t2 log2
(
1 +
∣∣hTS,U1w2∣∣2
σ2U1
)
, (25)
IFLConU2 = t3 log2
(
1 +
∣∣hTS,U2w1∣∣2
σ2U2
)
. (26)
In order to make the conventional method comparable to the
bidirectional one, we assume that the total available transmis-
sion time for both the network coding and the conventional
schemes are the same. In other words, the RL time for the users
is t1 and the FL for U1 and U2 are t2 and t3 = 1 − t1 − t2,
respectively.
3) Eavesdroppers’ channel capacities: The RL capacities
for E1 and E2 in the conventional SATCOM are the same
as the ones derived for the XOR network coding scheme.
Using (22) and (24), the FL capacity from the satellite toward
E1 and E2 to overhear the signals sent in Phases IV and VI,
respectively, are
IFLConE1 = t2 log2
(
1 +
∣∣hTS,E1w2∣∣2
σ2E1
)
, (27)
IFLConE2 = t3 log2
(
1 +
∣∣hTS,E2w1∣∣2
σ2E2
)
. (28)
4) Secrecy rate definition: The RL secrecy rate for U1
and U2 are the same as the XOR network coding scheme
in Section II-A5. In the conventional scheme, the messages
that E1 receives in the RL and FL are different and can be
decoded independently. Hence, the FL secrecy rate for U1 can
be defined using (25), (27) and the result from [52] as
SRFLConU1 = I
FLCon
U1
− IFLConE1 . (29)
Utilizing (17), (29), and Theorem 1 in [53], the end-to-end
secrecy rate for U1 is derived as
SRConU1 = min
{
SRRLU1 , SR
FLCon
U2
}
. (30)
The end-to-end secrecy rate for U2 can be defined in a similar
way. Like in Section II-A5, the sum secrecy rate is
SRCon = SRConU1 + SR
Con
U2 . (31)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE PROPOSED
SOLUTION
In this section, we study the problem of maximizing the
sum secrecy rate by optimizing the precoding vectors at the
GW to shape the satellite beams along with the RL and FL
7time allocation, given the maximum available power PS at
the satellite. We consider both the XOR network coding and
the conventional schemes. For the XOR network coding, we
just solve the optimal beamformer design for the secrecy rate
derived from the first case of the FL secrecy rate in (18). The
solutions for the optimal beamformer design for the other two
cases of (18) are similar to the first case of (18).
A. Network coding for bidirectional SATCOM
Using the sum secrecy rate defined in (20), the optimization
problem for the XOR network coding scheme is defined as
max
w,t1,t2
min
{
IRLU1 − IRLE1 ,min
{
IFLXORU1 , I
FLXOR
U2
}}
+min
{
IRLU2 − IRLE2 ,min
{
IFLXORU1 , I
FLXOR
U2
}}
s.t. t1 + t2 = 1,
‖w‖2 ≤ PS . (32)
To transform (32) into a standard convex form, we apply
the following procedures. First, we assume that t1 and t2 are
fixed and study the beamforming design. After designing the
optimal beamformer, the optimal time allocation is found by
performing 1-D search of t1 over the range (0, 1). Second,
after considering a fixed transmission time for the RL and FL,
the RL secrecy rate expressions in (32) are fixed and can be
dropped without loss of generality. Hence, (32) boils down
into
max
w
min
{
IFLXORU1 , I
FLXOR
U2
}
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ PS . (33)
Next, we introduce the auxiliary variable u to remove the
“min” operators. Then, (33) yields
max
w,u>0
u
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ PS ,
σ2U1
(
2
u
t2 − 1
)
≤ ∣∣hTS,U1w2∣∣2,
σ2U2
(
2
u
t2 − 1
)
≤ ∣∣hTS,U2w2∣∣2. (34)
The last two constraints in (34) are not convex. By introducing
W = wwH , we rewrite (34) as
max
W0,u>0
u
s.t. tr (W) ≤ PS ,
σ2U1
(
2
u
t2 − 1
)
≤ tr (WA) ,
σ2U2
(
2
u
t2 − 1
)
≤ tr (WB) , (35)
where A = h∗S,U1h
T
S,U1
and B = h∗S,U2h
T
S,U2
. The rank
constraint, rank (W) = 1, in (35) is dropped. The optimal
beamforming weight in (35) is designed for the FL trans-
mission. However, since the RL secrecy rates, which can
be bottlenecks for the total end-to-end secrecy rate, are not
considered in (35), extra unnecessary power at the satellite
may be utilized. To fix this, one last constraint is added to (35)
to get
max
W0,u>0
u
s.t. tr (W) ≤ PS ,
σ2U1
(
2
u
t2 − 1
)
≤ tr (WA) ,
σ2U2
(
2
u
t2 − 1
)
≤ tr (WB) ,
u ≤ max{IRLU1 − IRLE1 , IRLU2 − IRLE2 } . (36)
Problem (36) is recognized as a SDP problem, thus convex
and can be efficiently solved. According to Theorem 2.2
in [54], when there are three constraints on the matrix variable
of a SDP problem such as (36), existence of a rank-1 optimal
solution for NS > 2 is guaranteed. Hence, if the solution
to (36) happens not to be rank-one, we can use Theorem 2.2
in [54] to recover the rank-one optimal solution out of a non-
rank-1 solution.
According to [55], the complexity of problem (36) is
O
(3 +N2S)
(
N2S
(
N2S + 1
)
2
)3 . (37)
Solving (36) is accompanied along with a 1-D exhaustive
search over the time variable t. We assume that the time
variable is divided into m bins between 0 and 1. The overall
computational complexity for designing the beamformer for
the XOR network coding scheme is m times the complexity
mentioned in (37). This is typically affordable since the
optimization is performed at the GW on the ground.
B. Conventional SATCOM
According to the secrecy rate defined in (31), the optimiza-
tion problem for the conventional scheme is
max
w1,w2,t1,t2
min
{
IRLU1 − IRLE1 , IFLConU2 − IFLConE2
}
+min
{
IRLU2 − IRLE2 , IFLConU1 − IFLConE1
}
s.t. ‖w1‖2 + ‖w2‖2 ≤ PS . (38)
Assume that the power split between the beamforming vectors
w1 and w2 is βPS and (1− β)PS where β is a given
parameter with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Using the parameter β, the
beamforming vectors w1 and w2 in the power constraint
of (38) can be separated. Hence, (38) can be rewritten as
max
w1,w2,t1,t2
min
{
IRLU1 − IRLE1 , IFLConU2 − IFLConE2
}
+min
{
IRLU2 − IRLE2 , IFLConU1 − IFLConE1
}
s.t. ‖w1‖2 ≤ βPS ,
‖w2‖2 ≤ (1− β)PS . (39)
8The problem (39) can be expanded as
max
w1,w2,t1,t2
min
{
SRRLU1 , t2 log
(
σ2E2
σ2U2
σ2U2 + |hTS,U2w1|2
σ2E2 + |hTS,E2w1|2
)}
+min
{
SRRLU2 , t3 log
(
σ2E1
σ2U1
σ2U1 + |hTS,U1w2|2
σ2E1 + |hTS,E1w2|2
)}
s.t. ‖w1‖2 ≤ βPS ,
‖w2‖2 ≤ (1− β)PS . (40)
Before further simplifying (40), we first mention the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: If the achievable secrecy rate is strictly greater
than zero, the power constraints in (40) are active at the
optimal point w?1 and w
?
2 , i.e., ‖w1‖2 = βPS and ‖w2‖2 =
(1− β)PS .
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Using Theorem 1, we can show that the constraints in (40)
are active which enables us to write (40) as
max
w1,w2,t1,t2
min
{
IRLU1 − IRLE1 , t2 log
(
σ2E2
σ2U2
wH1 U2w1
wH1 E2w1
)}
+min
{
IRLU2 − IRLE2 , t3 log
(
σ2E1
σ2U1
wH2 U1w2
wH2 E1w2
)}
s.t. ‖w1‖2 = βPS ,
‖w2‖2 = (1− β)PS , (41)
where U1 ,
σ2U1
(1−β)PS I + h
∗
S,U1
hTS,U1 ,U2 ,
σ2U2
βPS
I +
h∗S,U2h
T
S,U2
,E1 ,
σ2E1
(1−β)PS I + h
∗
S,E1
hTS,E1 ,E2 ,
σ2E2
βPS
I +
h∗S,E2h
T
S,E2
.
The benefit of (41) is that given β, w1 and w2 can
be optimized separately. To be specific, the optimal w1
and w2 corresponds to the eigenvectors associated with the
maximum eigenvalues of matrices C = L−11 U1L
−H
1 and
D = L−12 U2L
−H
2 where E1 = L1L
H
1 and E2 = L2L
H
2 ,
respectively. As a result, (41) can be simplified into
max
0<t1<1
0<t2<1
min
{
IRLU1 − IRLE1 , t2 log
(
σ2E2
σ2U2
λmax (C)
)}
+min
{
IRLU2 − IRLE2 , t3 log
(
σ2E1
σ2U1
λmax (D)
)}
. (42)
Note that the constraints of (41) are dropped in (42) due to
the homogeneity of the objective function. To solve (42), we
introduce auxiliary variables as u1 and u2 to remove the “min”
operators as
max
t1,t2,u1,u2
u1 + u2
s.t. u1 ≤ t1c, (43a)
u1 ≤ t2 log
(
σ2E2
σ2U2
λmax (C)
)
, (43b)
u2 ≤ t1d, (43c)
u2 ≤ t3 log
(
σ2E1
σ2U1
λmax (D)
)
, (43d)
u1, u2 ≥ 0, (43e)
0 < t1 < 1, 0 < t2 < 1, (43f)
where
c , log
1 +
PU1‖hU1,S ‖2
σ2S(
1 +
PU1 |hU1,E1 |2
σ2E1
) , d , log 1 + PU2‖hU2,S ‖
2
σ2S(
1 +
PU2 |hU2,E2 |2
σ2E2
) ,
(44)
and t3 = 1 − t1 − t2. Clearly, it is a linear programming
problem and can be optimally solved. After that, we use 1-D
search to find the optimal power allocation parameter β?.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate
the secrecy rate of the XOR network coding based SATCOM
protocol and compare it with the conventional scheme. We
consider both i) equal RL and FL time allocation (ETA),
and ii) optimized time allocation between the RL and the FL
(OTA). We use labels “XOR-ETA” and “XOR-OTA” to denote
equal time allocation and optimal time allocation policies,
respectively.
In our simulations, B denotes the carrier bandwidth, 41.67
kHz, for both RL and FL transmissions. Since there is a main
direct link from the satellite to the users as well as some diffuse
components, the channel from the satellite to the users can be
modeled as Rician [56]. The K-factor for the FL is determined
by the multipath average scattered power and random log-
normal variable using the values provided by [56]. Due to
the “scintillation” effect [57], we have multipath in the RL.
Moreover, there exists a direct link like the FL case. Therefore,
the RL can be considered to follow Rician distribution with
a higher K-factor which is assumed to be 15 dB. The rest
of the link parameters are summarized in Table II [58]. The
satellite’s FL transmission power in Table II shows the carrier
power used in the following transmissions: 1) the broadcast
in Phase IV of the XOR scheme or, 2) the transmissions in
Phases IV and V of the conventional reference scheme. If
the satellite’s FL transmission power is not a variable in a
simulation scenario, its value provided by Table II is used.
The ground channels between the users and the eavesdrop-
pers are assumed to follow a Rayleigh distribution with the
pathloss calculated by
L = 10 log
[(
4pi
λ
)2
dγ
]
, (45)
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LINK BUDGET AND PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Satellite orbit type LEO
Operating band (1∼2 GHz) L-band
RL and FL frequency band, MHz 1616-1626.5
Beams on the Earth 48
Number of antenna arrays 318
Frequency reuse factor (FRF) 12
Number of carriers per beam 20
Carrier bandwidth, Bc, kHz 41.67
Guard bandwidth, kHz 2
Satellite’s antenna gain per beam, dBi 24.3
Total power at the satellite, dBW 31.46
Satellite noise temperature, K 290
Terminal noise temperature, K 321
Satellite’s FL transmission power, dBW 7.65
Mobile device radiation power, dBW 0
Mobile device antenna gain, dBi 3.5
Return and forward link pathloss, dB 151
Doppler shift due to satellite velocity, Hz 270
Envelope mean of the direct wave, ms 0.787
The variance of the direct wave, σ2s 0.0671
The power of the diffuse component 0.0456
where γ is the pathloss exponent which we assume to be
γ = 3.7. The maximum Doppler shift is calculated using the
following relation as
fDmax =
v
λ
=
vfc
c
, (46)
where v is the user’s speed, fc is the maximum frequency used
and c is the light speed.
Since the carrier bandwidth is 41.67 kHz, we assume that
the RL operating bandwidth is 1616−1616.04167 MHz for U1,
1616.04367− 1616.08534 MHz for U2 and the FL operating
bandwidth is 1616 − 1616.04167 MHz which is common
between the users. Each user is supposed to move in a random
direction with a 10 m/s speed. If not explicitly mentioned,
each eavesdropper’s distance to the user is randomly changed
between 2 to 2.5 km.
We first show the average sum secrecy rate in Fig. 2
when the number of feeds used on the satellite varies from
3 to 10. As we can see, the XOR network coding scheme
can achieve over 54% higher average sum secrecy rate than
the conventional one. It can be observed that optimizing the
RL and FL communication times improves the average sum
secrecy rate for both schemes considerably, especially for the
conventional scheme in higher number of feeds.
The effect of time allocation is further illustrated in Figs. 3
and 4 for the XOR network coding and the conventional
schemes, respectively. It is observed in Fig. 3 that for different
number of feeds, the average sum secrecy rate first increases,
and then then decreases with the RL time allocation t1. Here,
more time is allocated to the RL transmission which means
that the FL transmission rate is a bottleneck for the end-to-
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equal and optimal time allocation are employed.
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end rate. The time split between the RL and FL depends on
the number of feeds at the satellite. As the number of feeds
increases, the time devoted to the FL transmission increases.
This shows that the FL acts as a bottleneck for the end-to-end
communications. The change in the RL and FL time allocation
makes the channel secrecy rates closer to each other so that
the overall average secrecy rate increases. The optimal time
allocation for one RL slot and two FL slots in the conventional
scheme can be seen in Fig. 4.
The effect of the satellite’s FL transmission power on the
average secrecy rate is investigated in Figs. 5 and 6. In
Fig. 5, we see that the average secrecy rate for the equal time
allocation approach in both schemes starts to saturate as the
available power for the FL transmission increases. This can
be explained by the fact that as the available power increases,
the RL becomes a bottleneck for the end-to-end secrecy rate
and hinders the overall improvement. On the other hand,
while performing optimal time allocation over RL and FL, the
average secrecy rate keeps growing for both the conventional
and the XOR network coding schemes. It is seen in Fig. 6 that
by increasing the power at the satellite, more time is allocated
to the RL transmission in order to balance the RL and FL
secrecy rates and sustaining the secrecy rate growth. However,
after increasing the satellite’s power beyond a specific point,
the effect of the optimal time allocation fades out, and the
average secrecy rate in the optimal time allocation scheme
also saturates due to RL being a bottleneck. This fact can
be observed in Fig. 6. As the power of the FL transmission
increases, less time is exchanged between the RL and FL
transmission and the average secrecy rate saturates.
The effect of the distance between each user and the
corresponding eavesdropper is investigated in Figs. 7 and 8.
As is seen in Fig. 7, the average secrecy rate for equal time
allocation in both schemes saturates as the distance between
the user and eavesdropper increases. This is because increasing
the distance to the eavesdropper improves the secrecy rate in
the RL, leaving the FL as a performance bottleneck. When
the time allocation is optimized, the average secrecy rate
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shows notable gain in both schemes. However, after a specific
distance, the secrecy rate for the optimal power allocation
also saturates. Increasing the distance to the eavesdropper
increases the secrecy rate for the RL, but this increment
is going to be quite small at some point and consequently
vanishes. Consequently, as the distance increases, less time
exchange is required between the RL and FL transmission.
This fact can be seen in Fig. 8. Due to this limit in the RL
secrecy rate, the secrecy rate can be improved using optimal
time allocation up to a limited distance. Furthermore, as it is
observed in Fig. 7, the average sum secrecy rate of the XOR
network coding saturates in a much longer distance compared
to the conventional scheme. Interestingly, when the user and
the eavesdropper are close, the conventional scheme using the
optimal time allocation outperforms the XOR network coding
scheme using equal time allocation. This originates from the
fact that there are more degrees of freedom in terms of
optimal time allocation in the conventional scheme compared
to the XOR network coding scheme. Hence, when it comes
to picking up a secure protocol, distance plays an important
role.
The results in Fig. 8 illustrate that as the distance between
the user and the eavesdropper decreases, more time is allocated
to the RL transmission of the XOR network coding scheme in
order to balance the secrecy rates in RL and FL. It is observed
that as the distance to the eavesdropper increases, less change
is required in the RL and FL times. This is due to the fact that
as the distance increases, the improvement rate in the secrecy
rate of the RL is reduced and less regulation is required in the
transmission times.
V. CONCLUSION
Network coding principle has been known to increase the
throughput of bidirectional SATCOM. In this paper, we studied
the use of XOR network coding to improve the sum secrecy
rate of bidirectional SATCOM. The beamforming vector as
well as the optimal time allocation between the RL and the
FL were optimized to improve the secrecy rate. We compared
the sum secrecy rate of the XOR network coding with the
conventional scheme without using network coding regarding
realistic system parameters. Our results demonstrated that the
network coding based scheme outperforms the conventional
scheme substantially, especially when the legitimate users and
the eavesdroppers are not close.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: In the objective function of problem (40), only
the second argument of the “min” operators, FL secrecy rates,
include the beamforming vector. Hence, we focus on these
terms in our optimization. Using contradiction, we shall show
that ‖w?1‖2 = βPS and ‖w?2‖2 = (1− β)PS must hold for
the optimal solutions w?1 and w
?
2 . Assume that w
?
1 and w
?
2 are
the optimal solutions to (40) and satisfy ‖w1‖2 < βPS and
‖w2‖2 < (1− β)PS , then there exist constants α1 > 1 and
α2 > 1 that satisfy ‖ŵ?1‖2 = βPS and ‖ŵ?2‖2 = (1− β)PS
where ŵ?1 = α1w
?
1 and ŵ
?
2 = α2w
?
2 . Replacing w
?
1 by ŵ
?
1
and w?2 by ŵ
?
2 in the FL secrecy rates of the objective in (40),
we get
f1 (α1) = t2 log
(
σ2E2
σ2U2
σ2U2 + α
2
1|hTS,U2w?1|2
σ2E2 + α
2
1|hTS,E2w?1|2
)
,
f2 (α2) = t3 log
(
σ2E1
σ2U1
σ2U1 + α
2
2|hTS,U1w?2|2
σ2E1 + α
2
2|hTS,E1w?2|2
)
. (47)
Also, we assume that in the RL and FL of each user the secrecy
rate is nonzero which translates into
σ2E2
(
σ2U2 + |hTS,U2w1|2
)
> σ2U2
(
σ2E2 + |hTS,E2w1|2
)
,∃w1,
(48)
σ2E1
(
σ2U1 + |hTS,U1w2|2
)
> σ2U1
(
σ2E1 + |hTS,E1w2|2
)
,∃w2.
(49)
According to the conditions in (48) and (49), we can see that
f1(α) and f2(α) are monotonically increasing functions in
the parameters α1 and α2. This contradicts that w?1 and w
?
2
are the optimal solutions. Since adjusting the RL and FLs
transmission time balances the RL and FL secrecy rates, the
RL bottleneck does not limit the FL secrecy rate increment.
Hence, the power constraint should be active. This completes
the proof.
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